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1 !e author would like to thank the referees and Jan Melissen, Bruce Gregory, Kathy R. Fitzpatrick and Cameron Warriner for their valuable advice and as-
sistance.  
2 David Miliband, “Welcome to FCO’s blog pages,” Foreign and Commonwealth O"ce, last modi#ed September 26, 2007, https://blogs.fco.gov.uk/roller/
miliband/entry/welcome_to_the_fcos_blog.
3 See Arthur A. Bardos, “Public diplomacy: An Old Art, a New Profession,” Virginia Quarterly Review 77 (2001): 424-37; Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: 
Taxonomies and Histories,” Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, (!e Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 2006, Volume 
616), 31-54; Jan Melissen, “!e New Public Diplomacy: Between !eory and Practice,” in !e New Public Diplomacy: So" Power in International Relations, 
edited by Jan Melissen (New York & London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005/7), 3–27.
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 Former British Foreign Secretary of State, David Miliband, said it eloquently at the launch of the Foreign 
Commonwealth O"ce’s blog pages in September 2007: “!ese blog pages […] are intended to open up what too o$en has 
been a secret garden of diplomacy con#ned only to diplomats and those on the inside track.”2 !is is just one of myriad 
examples of how diplomacy has opened its doors to the public over the years. Nowadays this opening may seem obvious, but 
a generation ago public diplomacy was still considered to be an oxymoron and a euphemism for propaganda; a view which 
occasionally rears its head today. Some may have forgotten that the practice of public diplomacy hearkens back to before the 
construction of Rome’s highways.3 !is seeming contradiction in terms however has in no time become a #eld of study itself
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and is characterized by its relative youth, its multidisciplinary nature, and its lack of theoretical substance.4 Leading scholars 
today even argue beyond this and suggest that it no longer makes sense to distinguish between diplomacy and public 
diplomacy as traditional and new practices are increasingly morphing into one inclusive mode of diplomacy.5  
 Despite that in times of budgetary shortfalls it is one of the !rst areas to experience cuts, numerous ministries have 
indeed realized that investing in public diplomacy is a vital though less direct alternative to their mission of in"uencing their 
governmental peers. Diplomats and other government representatives abroad (such as international trade and development 
o#cers) spent a signi!cant portion of their time explaining the work, positions and choices of their ministries to foreign 
public opinion leaders. Regardless of these e$orts, there appears at the same time to be the unusual presupposition that public 
diplomacy only involves engaging with foreign publics. With a few exceptions, mostly from the !eld of communication,6 the 
scholarly community is in the same boat. 
 Public diplomacy remains a cipher for the domestic public. It is predominantly associated with its international 
aspect: directed towards foreign publics and conducted abroad. Nevertheless social media and the increasing mobility of 
global citizens have blurred distinctions between domestic and international audiences. Many governments are pushing for 
“21st Century ministries of foreign a$airs” to adapt to this evolving environment, but they seem to cling to the traditional 
distinction between domestic and international. What is more, ministries of foreign a$airs (MFAs) do develop public outreach 
activities similar to those abroad but directed at a domestic audience, and they do collaborate with domestic citizens in 
carrying out public diplomacy programs (such as exchanges), but they do not necessarily acknowledge them as part of the 
concept of public diplomacy. %is is where denial hurts. 
 Practitioners and scholars must not drown themselves in terminological discussions, or in John Brown’s words: 
“harping on de!nitions can be intriguing, but it o&en leads to an intellectual dead-end.”7 %ere is more going on than meets 
the eye, and one must be willing to look beyond the seeming paradox of coupling “domestic” to “public diplomacy” towards 
current evolutions in society, behind which public diplomacy development cannot fall.  Stressing the domestic spectrum 
of public diplomacy may seem counterintuitive given the standard research, but it forces one to think about broader 
“societization” evolutions in diplomacy and of giving “diplomacy” a more symbolic meaning as the involvement of non-
traditional diplomatic actors increases.  It is well past time to change public diplomacy’s tune, step onto what may seem like 
alien ground or de!nitionally impossible8 and explore the under-studied domestic facet of public diplomacy while nourishing 
debate on how to move the !eld forward and beyond its “new” and “old” categories. As there are currently more questions 
than answers, this paper’s aim is to introduce the topic and to open debate on this matter.
#$%&'()*+%(&,)-.%/.
& Times have changed, and public diplomacy must not fall behind but be developed in today’s circumstances. 
Arguments in favor of integrating a domestic component into public diplomacy complementary to its international dimension 
are mainly related to the belief that it is not a stand-alone !eld. Public diplomacy is part of wider evolutions in the society in 
which it operates and from which it must not become disconnected. Societal evolutions have an impact on foreign policy-
making as well as diplomatic practice, of which public diplomacy is an intrinsic part. Public diplomacy’s domestic dimension 
must be understood within what Jan Melissen referred to as one of the most salient transformational developments in 
diplomatic practice: its “societization.”9 Namely, over the years (public) diplomacy’s walls have been crumbling and a myriad 
of actors have pushed their way in while the boundaries between international and domestic publics and policy spheres have 
simultaneously blurred.10 %is process has been kicked into high gear by ongoing globalization and the changing information 
ecosystem. When confronted with a broadened scope of actors, diplomatic activity with a domestic consciousness becomes 
more prominent.
4 See Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a %eory of Public Diplomacy,” Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, edited by Geo$rey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull, 55-77.
5 Jan Melissen, “Public Diplomacy,” Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: !eories and Practices, edited by Pauline Kerr and Geo$ Wiseman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming). 
6 See for example Jozef Bátora, “Public Diplomacy between Home and Abroad: Norway and Canada,” !e Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 1 (2006), 53–80; Katy 
R. Fitzpatrick, “%e US Public Diplomacy’s Neglected Domestic Mandate,” USC Center on Public Diplomacy Perspectives Paper 3 (October 2010), 1-51; Naren 
Chitty, “Australian Public Diplomacy” in Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, edited by Nancy Snow (New York & London: Routledge, 2008), 314-22; Evan 
H. Potter, Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s So" Power through Public Diplomacy (Montreal QC/Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2009), 54–5; 
György Szondi, “Public Diplomacy and Nation-Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Di$erences,” Discussion Papers in Diplomacy (%e Hague: Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, October 2008); Rhonda S. Zaharna, Battles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy a"er 
9/11 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
7 John Brown. “Public Diplomacy & Propaganda: %eir Di$erences.” American Diplomacy Publishers, accessed June 12, 2011, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplo-
mat/item/2008/0709/comm/brown_pudiplprop.html.
8 Melissen, “Public Diplomacy.”
9 Melissen, “Public Diplomacy.”
10 Ellen Huijgh, “%e Public Diplomacy of Federated Entities: Examining the Quebec Model,” !e Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 5 (2010), 126.
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 Public diplomacy’s domestic dimension must also be understood within the ongoing democratization of foreign 
policy. More particularly, public diplomacy’s domestic dimension has to be read as an intrinsic part of ongoing direct and 
internal democratization of foreign policy. It—ideally—moves beyond the notion of electing representatives and their modus 
operandi towards the continuous participation of domestic constituencies in foreign policy formation, debate, cooperation, 
and the conduct of diplomatic a!airs. Foreign policy democratization is unfortunately still frequently based on "awed 
assumptions about the relationship between consultation and democracy.11 It is not this paper’s intent to search for answers 
to questions of whether foreign policy democratization can be achieved by just increasing the number of citizens involved, 
whether stakeholders’ self-interests will institutionalize access to foreign policy-making instead of making overtures to the 
demos, or whether intermediates will preach foreign policy democratization just to ensure themselves a seat at the decision-
making table.12 Rather, raising awareness about the fact that while some countries may start looking to their citizens as public 
diplomacy resources, citizen participation risks remaining a subject of government lip-service or what Kim Nossal calls “an 
elusive ideal” without consensus on what constitutes democratization of the foreign policy and diplomacy.
 #is being said, one does not need to reinvent the wheel to answer the question of why MFAs should care about 
domestic publics. #ey, for better or worse, have learned through experience that domestic public support for a government’s 
international policy choices and positions is crucial to the MFA’s legitimacy at home and abroad. Partly due to a gap between 
rhetoric (words) and reality (deeds), MFAs have been struggling with at-home identity crises (e.g. a distrust of political 
representatives and a malaise with progress), which are in one way or another re"ected on the international stage. #ough 
some MFAs still try to get away with providing con"icting stories abroad and at home, the support of the citizenry, those 
they ought to be representing abroad, is the bread and butter of their credibility overseas and thus the government’s strategic 
interests. Internal legitimacy remains a precondition for international respect.
 In this view, MFAs risk failing to determine the proper formula for e$ciently reaching out on foreign policy to 
foreign publics abroad if they bypass their “own” citizens. #ese “own” citizens are less of a homogeneous mass than the 
term suggests. Societies today include di!use populations, such as transnational ethnic groups and so-called global citizens 
(e.g. one %&h of Canadians are foreign born,13 2.5 million people in Germany are Turkish immigrants14). #ey have ongoing 
and widespread connections with citizens from other countries and from their countries of origin. #ey fundamentally 
change a society’s composition and thus the raw material from which its collective identities, ideas, and interests are derived. 
Governments must learn to work with other than the “usual suspects of targeted audiences” in order to establish networks that 
have connections with diverse communities at home and abroad and thereby expand public diplomacy’s reach.
 Investing in the domestic dimension can thus be seen as a logical and necessary step in the chronological process 
and further development of public diplomacy conducted abroad. #is is not just wishful thinking. In a world where the 
e!ectiveness of a government’s public diplomacy increasingly "ourishes in inverse proportion to the degree of visible state 
interference, domestic audiences can be a public and a partner in public diplomacy at the same time, but o$cials’ legitimate 
roles may be hollowed-out further. Partly due to their credibility amongst foreign peers, divergent non-state actors at home 
have become prominent intermediaries of initially state-centred public diplomacy. Although not all citizen communities will 
be allies to governments’ public diplomacy initiatives,15 investments in these domestic publics is vital for encouraging them as 
participants and partners in interaction with citizens of other countries around shared foreign policy concerns.
 Investing in networks and collaboration with domestic civil society actors is not only relevant from a government’s 
perspective. It can also respond to the increasing desire among key segments of the population for engagement opportunities 
with foreign publics on international issues of shared concern. Foreign policy is o&en popularly seen as of little interest to 
domestic publics,16 but in a global environment where domestic (security) concerns are increasingly linked to international 
events domestic politics has become part of the diplomatic process. Domestically-focused actors are increasingly aware of 
how international issues a!ect them and that the issues they care about at home have international rami%cations; 9/11 and the 
2008 global economic crisis may have been wake-up calls. It can further be seen in how widespread public demonstrations in 
Tunisia and Egypt have sparked a wave of similar protests across North Africa and the Near East, and in sister demonstrations
11  Kim R. Nossal, “#e Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy: #e Elusive Ideal,” in Canada Among Nations: Democracy and Foreign Policy, edited by 
Maxwell A. Cameron, Maureen Appel Molot (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 41.
12  Ibid., 33-39.
13  “Immigration in Canada: A Portrait of the Foreign-born Population, 2006 Census: Immigration: Driver of population growth,” Statistics Canada, accessed 
June 12, 2011, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-557/p2-eng.cfm.
14  “Demographic Trends,” Facts About Germany, accessed June 12, 2011, http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/society/main-content-08/demo-
graphic-trends.html.
15  Zaharna quite rightly argues that MFAs and their public diplomats o&en ignore opposing parties in public diplomacy initiatives and that trying to engage 
them in the project may give legitimacy to a controversial initiative and dissuade others who might sabotage it. Rhonda S. Zaharna, “#e Public Diplomacy 
Challenges of Strategic Stakeholder Engagement,” in Trials of Engagement: !e Future of US Public Diplomacy, (Leiden: Brill/Martinus Nijho! Publishers, 
2011), 227-29. 
16  See Daryl Copeland, “#e Seven Paradoxes of Public Diplomacy,” in Trials of Engagement: !e Future of US Public Diplomacy, (Leiden: Brill/Martinus 
Nijho! Publishers, 2011), 193-4. 
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Western countries where citizens are demanding that their respective governments intervene internationally in the events. 
 Scholars17 have provided a necessary dose of caution to the “double-edged” nature of diplomacy and foreign 
policy-making. !ere is no place here for a detailed discussion, but di"erent examples18 have shown how internal forces 
play equally as crucial roles as external political pressures in the pursuit and execution of an MFA’s aspirations, goals, and 
decisions. !e domestic politics behind foreign policy, however, can be neither ignored nor allowed to drive it. !e cra#ing 
and implementation of public diplomacy’s domestic dimension must thus not be injected with partisan vote-seeking and 
parliamentary seat counts; a bad habit that frequently pops up when diaspora voters are up for grabs. Public diplomacy 
overseas must also not be employed to serve domestic propaganda goals (convince citizens of a false international image 
of global admiration for their country), which according to Nicholas Cull was the case within the Brezhnev-era USSR and 
currently is within contemporary Chinese and the United States’ public diplomacy.19 Regarding the latter, Ali Fisher notes that 
public diplomacy with a domestic propaganda narrative of “getting power over the other” comes at the detriment of genuine 
dialogue with and empowerment of populations overseas.20 
 Investment in domestic citizens driven by short-sighted electoral advantage is one of opponents’ most fundamental 
critiques against the inclusion of a domestic dimension into public diplomacy. Within this context it can be useful to 
di"erentiate partisan electoral politics and the politics surrounding policy formation. !is raises additional queries of whether 
it is the result rather than the method that makes domestic outreach by political leaders propaganda or the necessary shaping 
of public opinion and policy position at home. !ere are also overlapping issues; investments in the domestic dimension of 
public diplomacy with a focus on a particular issue might, whether by chance or on purpose, provide an electoral advantage 
to some candidates for political o$ce.21 !e tantalizing pitfall of investing in public diplomacy’s domestic dimension solely 
out of electoral advantage motivations, however, must at all costs be dealt with. Politicians must therefore learn to resist the 
temptation, while administrations should avoid using it as an excuse for shying away from cutting through bureaucratic red 
tape. 
 So though public diplomacy’s domestic side brings signi%cant advantages with it (evolving with societal realities, 
bolstering governments’ internal and external legitimacy, buttressing international public diplomacy), it is put in jeopardy 
when used as a tool of domestic propaganda or political brinkmanship. Now that the broader context is more clear, one has to 
take a glimpse at what the domestic dimension of public diplomacy can entail and how it has been developed over the years.
#$%%&%$'()*+,)-'*,%'.*$&'./)0$1,'2$&'
 To understand what the domestic dimension of public diplomacy can entail, one has to mirror the well-documented 
evolutions of the international dimension with its domestic corollary. Without touching too deeply upon areas that others 
have more thoroughly explored, a brief rundown will be provided to demonstrate how evolutions in public diplomacy are 
also relevant to and have in&uenced its domestic facets. To give a bird’s eye view, the literature makes a distinction between 
traditional post-Cold War and new 21st Century public diplomacy. !is does not particularly entail a shi# in public 
diplomacy. !e theoretical plea in favour of a “new” or “21st Century” public diplomacy22 has rather highlighted the need 
to rework more traditional views of public diplomacy’s core components in reaction to an evolving environment. One can 
note the changing interpretations of public diplomacy’s goals (from static message design and delivery to dynamic network 
exchange and interaction), actors (from states to multiple actors), public (from passive and international opinion leaders to 
both active and domestic and international audiences and the public at large), their links (from distinct to connected), culture 
(from cultural barriers between ‘them’ and ‘us’ to the incorporation of cultural diversity), and means (from information
17  See Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: !e Logic of Two-level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1998), 427-60; Peter 
B. Evans, “Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Re&ections and Projections,” in Double-Edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics, edited by Peter B. Evans, Harrold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam (Berkeley/LA/California University of California Press, 
2003), 397-43.
18  See Gerry C. Alons, “Predicting a State’s Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3 (July 
2007), 211-32; and literature on the domestic politics of foreign policy. 
19  Nicholas J. Cull, “Karen Hughes and the Brezhnev Syndrome: !e Trial of Public Diplomacy as Domestic Performance,” in Trials of Engagement: !e Future 
of US Public Diplomacy, (Leiden: Brill/Martinus Nijho" Publishers, 2011), 117-32.
20  Ali Fisher, “Looking at the Man in the Mirror: Understanding of Power and In&uence in Public Diplomacy,” in Trials of Engagement, 276-280.
21  I’m indebted to Bruce Gregory for this note. 
22  See, for instance, Brian Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy” and Shaun Riordan, “Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy 
Paradigm,” in !e New Public Diplomacy; Nancy Snow, “Rethinking Public Diplomacy,” Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 3-12; Rhonda. S. Zaharna, “Mapping Out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives: Information and Relational Communication Frameworks,” 
Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy.
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dissemination to relationship-building-related activity).23 In essence, supporters of a contemporary image of public diplomacy 
argue for the re-emergence of “public networking” over “government communication.” !ey prefer “governance” over 
“governments” and “networking” over “informing.”24 !is is the context in which one must understand the evolutions in and 
attitude towards public diplomacy’s domestic dimension as well.
 Over the years there have generally been two terms that have been associated with the domestic dimension of public 
diplomacy: public a"airs and domestic outreach.
"#$%&'()$#%*+,$(&+$&-.+/$#01&"#$%&2345,6&7))*,#8&+$&9$%.8+,6&:3+#.*6;
 Since the end of the Cold War, public diplomacy has traditionally been associated with informing and one-way 
communication with foreign publics. One-sided communication with domestic audiences has frequently been de#ned in 
terms of public a"airs. Public a"airs was initially used by corporate entities as a sub#eld of corporate communication,  another 
term that frequently pops up as the domestic equivalent of public diplomacy.25 Public a"airs is a specialized form of corporate 
communication dedicated to informing targeted domestic publics about foreign policy goals, positions and activities. 
 To secure a domestic buy-in, and given di"erent government political structures and climates, an MFA (mostly 
the communication branch but also through high-level o$cials such as (prime) ministers and presidents on priority issues) 
typically undertakes the following public a"airs activities: (inter)national press releases, brie#ngs, and services; local and 
national media outreach and interviews; website development and management; responding to the public’s foreign policy 
questions via multiple media; producing audio-visual resources; providing information to missions and publics at large; and 
organizing events (e.g. visits to the department such as Open Days). !e thousands of websites and even more brochures and 
%yers speak for themselves, while the literature has stressed that in the age of information overload the e"ect of governmental 
info-bullying remains limited. !ough government communication remains important, public diplomacy’s domestic 
dimension is by no means the mere application of communication techniques or of disseminating messages through networks. 
!ey are not done for their own sake or as ends in themselves. !ey are tools used in genitive stages of the logical process in 
public diplomacy’s genesis to achieve the goal of building relationships and foreign policy cooperation.
 In dividing public a"airs from public diplomacy, Ken Heller and Liza Persson suggest three parameters: core 
commitment, purpose, and primary audience.  According to these authors, while public a"airs must inform a domestic 
population about government actions and motives (thus on how the resources that voters make available are used), public 
diplomacy is about in%uencing the publics and leaders of foreign nations. !eir view is based on the idea that public 
diplomacy is in itself strategic, while public a"airs ought not be. !ey are of the opinion that public a"airs activities must 
not focus on directing, shaping, or manipulating public actions, opinions, or perceptions.  Realistically, however, it is all 
too tempting to use public a"airs as a tool when changes in public opinion are desired. Besides, arguably all information, 
especially information that is disseminated by governance and diplomatic actors, has an in%uencing e"ect regardless of 
the actors’ intention.28 Some scholars instead consider public diplomacy to be the international face of a foreign ministry’s 
domestic public a"airs and stresses that both use similar activities and techniques but are directed towards other audiences.29
 Even though scholars’ approaches to the relation between public diplomacy and public a"airs di"er, when equating 
public diplomacy’s domestic dimension to public a"airs, as de#ned in terms of informing, it cannot fall behind an
23  See Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, “U.S. Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: From Messaging to Mutuality,” paper presented at ISA Conference, Montréal, March 
16-19, 2011; Rhonda. S. Zaharna, “!e So& Power Di"erential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy,” !e Hague Journal 
of Diplomacy, 2 (2007), 213–22.
24  Huijgh, “Public Diplomacy of Federated Entities,” 126.
25  Corporate communication was initially used to describe the communication of business #rms but over the years it has increasingly been applied on govern-
ment organizations. It then refers to an organizations’ management instrument that uses all of the employed forms of internal and external communication as 
e$ciently as possible and tunes them so as to create a positive position with the targeted publics with which the organization has a dependency relationship. 
Corporate communications is an overarching term for organization, management and marketing communication and their sub#elds. Applied to public diplo-
macy, organization communication is especially used to build long-term relationships with foreign and domestic publics. Management communication is ap-
plied to prevent fragmentation by coordinating the increasing amount of di"erent state and non-state actors engaged in public diplomacy. One-way marketing 
communication instruments (i.e. advertising and broad image campaigns) and short-time management evaluations seem to be less e"ective than presumed in 
enhancing dialogue through long-term mission statements and customized small-scale messages, lying at the very core of public diplomacy. See Cees McRiel 
and Charles Fombrun, Essentials of Corporate Communication (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).
26  Ken S. Heller and Liza M. Persson, “!e Distinction between Public A"airs and Public Diplomacy,” in Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, 225–33.
27  Such a view is very much in line with the traditional, but arguably outdated, distinction made by the late American career diplomat, Philip Habib, between 
public diplomacy and public a"airs: “!e word diplomacy means outside and has nothing to do with what you are trying to do with the American people. 
Gaining the support of the American people for US foreign policy initiatives is entirely di"erent from attempting to pursue the interests of the United States 
in the foreign arena.” See Philip F. Habib, “Concluding Remarks,” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, edited by Richard F. Staar (Hoover Institution Press, 
1986), 283.
28  Huijgh, “Public Diplomacy of Federated Entities,” 139
29  See Potter, Branding Canada, 56.
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upgrading towards a more network relational approach to public diplomacy. Changing environments and associated mindsets 
partly explain why the interpretation of public a!airs has moved to a more two-way direction involving domestic stakeholder 
engagement. At best then, public a!airs informs foreign policy but more o"en than not continues to ignore or minimize the 
domestic-international nexus despite the facts that public a!airs professionals at larger embassies are o"en in charge of public 
diplomacy and that these projects frequently involve domestic partners (e.g. international exchanges, visitor programs).  
#ough public a!airs is increasingly interpreted as the engagement of an MFA’s stakeholders, in addition to its policy 
communication towards the citizenry, domestic outreach is considered to be a better term for re$ecting a relational approach.  
Some may see domestic outreach as part of public a!airs, but in this context it is usually not interpreted in terms of creating 
“mutual understanding” between citizens, but as responding to information requests.30 #e evolution from informational 
towards more multi-actor network relational approaches explains why the term “domestic outreach” is nowadays increasingly 
used, and it ought to re$ect a contemporary approach to public diplomacy. In so doing, domestic outreach surpasses public 
a!airs in stressing the increasingly (inter)active role of domestic citizens in public diplomacy (self-governing participants and 
potential collaborators rather than passive recipients) and the interplay of public diplomacy’s features at home and abroad. #e 
term is therefore sometimes interchangeably used with “domestic public diplomacy,” as was the case in Canada.31
 Domestic outreach as a facet of public diplomacy primarily concerns longer-term goals that are at public diplomacy’s 
heart: supporting civil society initiatives that encourage relationship-building, understanding, and in$uence. Domestic 
outreach can also advance mid-term goals by raising the pro%le of international issues and government priorities. #e 
development of domestic outreach as a branch of the broader public diplomacy project can serve several aims. First, it can 
buttress international public diplomacy by broadening reach and in$uence with key foreign publics (e.g. government support 
for domestic audiences’ international activities). Second, it can help ameliorate citizens’ capabilities with the objective of 
encouraging informed dialogue about governmental policy, priorities, and international topics. #ird, it can stimulate greater 
public comprehension of complex international issues and thereby prepare citizens for the fast-paced global environment. 
Fourth, it can answer the increasing need of certain populations for expanded chances to interact with foreign counterparts on 
international topics about which the both care.
 #e majority of globally recurrent domestic outreach activities usually include speaker programs, policy 
e-discussions, and the well-known paths of organizing and participating in conferences and working groups. Speaker 
programs mostly include talks across the country from government representatives (ambassadors or heads of missions) 
around certain topics relevant to the government, and are targeted at both speci%c and larger audiences. It can also include 
talks at the ministry itself (such as student group seminars). See for example Canada’s speaker and corporate outreach 
program, the United States’ speakers and specialists program, the United Kingdom’s 2008 Bringing Foreign Policy Home 
Initiative,32 the Dutch Rent an Ambassador program, and India’s Distinguished Lecture Series.
 Regular, institutionalized, and informed public dialogue ought to build greater public understanding of foreign policy 
and international issues or governmental priorities. It can take the form of policy consultations or organization of conferences 
and workshops within and across the country. Indonesia’s “Foreign Policy Breakfast forum,” India’s series of conferences on 
issues of local concern across the country, and sensitizing actions on Eurpoean Union-related issues by member states or 
by candidate countries exemplify this.33 It can also take place virtually through online policy discussions (posting topical 
questions and responses on MFAs’ websites) with citizens (mostly students and scholars but open to all). Canada has become 
internationally renowned for its decade-old e-discussions34 but now seems to have turned them in for so-called “open” policy 
development and web 2.0 community working groups, which still await implementation.
 Despite their success, speaker programs and policy e-discussions have weaknesses in e&ciency and implementation: 
they are still used as conveniences (facilitating the appearance of dialogue) rather than as real tools of public engagement; they 
lack evaluation and follow-up and do not systematically inform foreign policy making; and despite greater interdivisional
30  Fitzpatrick, “Neglected Mandate,” 35.
31  See the Government of Canada, Department of Foreign A!airs and International Trade, Domestic Outreach Division, Call for applications for the Foreign 
Policy Dialogue, Citizen Diplomacy, Model Political Assemblies Program, November 9, 2005. 
32  See Steven Curtis, Caroline Clennell-Jaine, “Securing the State through Dialogue at Home: #e Bringing Foreign Policy Home Initiative: Pakistan Outreach” 
(Presented at ISA Conference, Montréal, March 16-19, 2011).
33  In European countries, a six-month European Union presidency creates additional opportunities to conduct sensitizing actions directed at the domestic 
public on E.U.-related issues while candidate countries deliver talks at home and abroad to seek public support for E.U. accession and for which speci%c E.U. 
funds (see E.U. citizen enlargement projects) are frequently used by. See Andrli' Mladen, Suzana Simichen-Sopta, Iva Tarle, “Practices of Public Diplomacy in 
Communicating NATO and E.U. Values with the Domestic Public in Croatia” (paper presented at ISA Conference, Montréal, March 16-19, 2011). For more 
information on Indonesia’s institutionalized series of discussions between high level o&cials and leading Indonesians in various %elds see: Rizal Sukma, “So" 
power and Public Diplomacy:  #e Case of Indonesia,” in Public Diplomacy and So! Power in East Asia, edited by Sook Jong Lee and Jan Melissen (Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
34  Jozef Batora, “Emerging Tenets of Responsive Foreign Policy Making,” International Journal, 61 (Autumn 2006): 929-42. 
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cooperation (see for example in New Zealand),35 they remain MFA-centered and lack a whole-of-government approach. !e 
current obsession with social media may also blind MFAs to older proven and e"ective methods. !e choice is not binary: 
neither solely traditional nor modern; neither solely international nor domestic. 
 So-called “citizen diplomacy programs” with the MFA and its representatives as boundary-spanners may o"er a 
better venue for connecting domestic citizens to their foreign contemporaries around foreign policy issues. Its added value lays 
in the bottom-up approach as it contributes #nancially to projects originating in civil society whereby preference is given to 
projects that enable knowledge acquisition, increased awareness, promote the understanding of global a"airs, and, above all, 
enable connections with peers abroad around common foreign policy issues. Support to think tanks and semi-detached bodies 
remains important for expanding policy capacity development and developing global research or communities already deeply 
entrenched in relevant civil society bodies. Minorities, diasporas, faith-based entities, expatriates, and university alumni could 
all play more active roles in future outreach to foreign publics, and their potential has recently grabbed governmental and 
scholarly attention.36  
 !ere are thus porous borders between public diplomacy “by” and “for” civil society and the increasingly popular 
alleged “citizen diplomacy.” Both acknowledge the role of civil society in diplomacy more easily and have a people-to-people 
approach in common, but more research is needed on what types of civil society communication and relationships compose 
public diplomacy and what kinds of cross-cultural internationalism do not. Bluntly put, however, public diplomacy’s people-
to-people approach shies away from intercultural relations in the sense that the role (e.g. coordinator, facilitator, boundary-
spanner instead of messenger) of governmental actors and the connection with foreign policy content is more prominent than 
in citizen diplomacy. 
 !ough there is no one-size-#ts-all template, a government’s public diplomacy strategy needs to be interpreted 
as a systematic series of policy initiatives focusing on developing and managing relationships around foreign policy and 
international issues of common relevance between the homeland and other populations. It should be considered an 
overarching framework for bringing a level of coherence to the range of public outreach programs created and put into reality 
by various actors at home and abroad.37
#$%&'()*+,&-./&0$%&1.0%23*-4
 !e domestic and international spectra of public diplomacy develop public outreach activities, which while not 
identical (such as the degree of intensity of consultation and di"erences in content), the means (conference participation, 
workshops, institutionalized dialogue, talks of speakers) and actors (state and civil society) by which such engagement 
occurs are very much alike. !ey may bene#t from being developed in greater relation to one another as part of a broader 
public engagement project wherein their complementarities must reinforce the outcome and maximize the desired results. 
!e question thus arises of why they should maintain their separation?  One of the most common issues pointed out 
in the literature is the di"erence in their targeted publics.38 It would indeed be utopist to imagine a world with a single 
global opinion.  One must also not forget that the intensity of the consultation and engagement process with domestic 
and international audiences di"ers largely, due to the fact that government engagement abroad does not directly a"ect the 
government’s chances of re-election. However, foreign public opinion can also play a role in the re-election of a government 
however.
 Nevertheless in a mobile and virtually connected universe of global communities, advanced communication 
technology, and international media, the supposed separation between “domestic” and “foreign” publics is relative as well. 
Naren Chitty for instance, argues that in a world of dispersed populations, alternate views of public diplomacy must
35  New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign A"airs and Trade established a Domestic Outreach Fund to ensure a more strategic approach by linking outreach to do-
mestic audiences to the ministry’s statement of intent and to divisions’ operational plans. !e broad aim is for the fund to be applied within the framework of 
an overarching domestic outreach strategy to ensure that the ministry’s engagement with domestic audiences is e"ective and coordinated (at a ministry-wide 
instead of divisional level). !e fund’s objectives include: li$ing the quality of the Ministry’s engagement with stakeholders and mainstreaming it as a Ministry 
activity, building support among constituencies which are central to achieving the government’s policy objectives, and supporting priorities. I am indebted to 
Simon Mark, former Public Diplomacy Adviser at the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign A"airs and Trade for this information. See New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign A"airs and Trade, “Post-Election Brief – November 2008, also http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Publications/Post-Election-Brief/0-
brief11.php.
36  See for example Canada’s Department of Foreign A"airs and International Trade, Global Citizens Workshop, March 30, 2010; Alan Gamlen, “Diaspora 
Engagement: What, How, Why?” (Presented at the Exploring Diaspora Strategies Conference, NUI Maynooth, January 26-28, 2009); Aine O’Neill, “Advacing 
Diaspora Knowledge Networks” (Presented at the Exploring Diaspora Strategies Conference, NUI Maynooth, January 26-28, 2009). 
37  !ough originally referring to diaspora diplomacy Boyle’s and Kitchin’s statement is equally relevant in this context. Mark Boyle and Rob Kitchin., “Dias-
pora Strategy Wheel and Ten Principles of Good Practice,” accessed June 12, 2011, http://www.nuim.ie/nirsa/diaspora.
38  See for example: Ken S. Heller and Liza M. Persson, “!e Distinction between Public A"airs and Public Diplomacy,” 225–33.; Potter, Branding Canada, 56. 
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acknowledge that domestic and foreign publics can no longer be separated and that both must be addressed.39 Rhonda 
Zaharna also points out that today the notion of geographically segmented audiences has become problematic for two major 
reasons. First, it has become nearly impossible to develop a communication message for one targeted audience that will not be 
heard by the international community. Second, the idea of speaking to people of one region while virtually ignoring the rest of 
the world is arti!cial and has adverse e"ects on public opinion.40
 Surprisingly, the precarious addition of the domestic public into the system of diplomatic governance seems to be 
above all a case of Western—perhaps largely American—distress.” With a few exceptions, and given that in Europe the tide 
appears to be turning (e.g. the United Kingdom’s Bringing Foreign Policy Home initiative), former standards and trendsetters 
appear to have the greatest reluctance. For example, the United States’ 1948 Smith–Mundt Act banned dissemination of public 
diplomacy materials to citizens of the United States. Although this did not preclude public diplomacy e"orts to enhance 
Americans’ understanding of foreign a"airs, its interpretation resulted in the chronic ignorance of domestic audiences and 
according to some authors holds serious consequences for its future success.41 One of the occidental exceptions was Canada, a 
frontrunner in integrating a domestic dimension into its public diplomacy strategy. Its e"orts to consult civil society are also 
internationally known as trendsetting (such as the ban on landmines, foreign policy dialogue, and e-discussions). Canada’s 
innovative approach to public engagement on foreign policy has been nipped in the bud however. A recent rethinking 
of public diplomacy’s place within the Department of Foreign A"airs and International Trade has led to its decline and a 
scattering of related domestic activities.
 Newcomers to the !eld of public diplomacy seem to be less suspicious. #ey have several advantages for coping 
with changes in diplomatic practice. Building upon their predecessors’ know-how, they may be able to initially avoid similar 
problems in dealing with public diplomacy makeovers. Moreover, they are not committed to former public diplomacy 
standards, which may not be suited to the current evolving environment and could become a hindrance to further progress.42 
Innovation, then, can come from the least expected corners. National state actors are not the sole governmental players. Some 
sub-national entities with increased international involvement but limited political-economic powers, such as Catalonia 
(Spain), are well known for their bottom-up citizen initiatives and have from the start included a domestic and international 
dimension in their public diplomacy strategy.43   
 Also interesting are Asian countries. India’s Ministry of External A"airs established a public diplomacy division in 
2006, which has recently been updated with a new website and a surge of energy. As a result, public diplomacy is nowadays 
seen as taking place both in external and internal contexts and considers the domestication of foreign policy an important 
component of India’s public diplomacy.44 Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry Directorate of Public Diplomacy has also integrated 
domestic components into its strategy and runs projects such as the Young Indonesian Ambassadors program for high school 
students to stimulate exchange with international peers.45
 Some caution is needed here. A$er all, everything may seem !ne on paper, but the implementation of such a public 
diplomacy strategy with both a domestic and international dimension still leaves room for developing public engagement 
projects abroad and at home in a more complementary fashion. #e question also arises of how Asian countries, where 
governments still play a dominant role and conduct a mainly state-centered public diplomacy and civil society does not, can 
pass beyond the public a"airs stage and thus beyond informing citizens reactively. China is a unique example in this regard. 
While in the Chinese doctrine the phrase “public diplomacy” may have referred exclusively to the task of explaining foreign 
policy at home,46 and while the MFA’s present public diplomacy strategy may target both domestic and foreign publics, 
citizens’ speech remains restricted.47
39  Naren Chitty, “Public Diplomacy: Courting Publics for Short-term Advantage or Partnering Publics for Lasting Peace and Sustainable Prosperity?” in Trials 
of Engagement: !e Future of US Public Diplomacy, edited by Ali Fisher, Scott Lucas (Leiden: Brill/Martinus Nijho" Publishers, 2011), 255. 
40  Zaharna, Battles to Bridges, 170.
41  See Fitzpatrick, “#e US Public Diplomacy’s Neglected Mandate,” 38. 
42  Huijgh, “Public Diplomacy Federated Entities,” 127. 
43  See Government of Catalonia, Foreign A"airs Strategy 2011-2015, June 2010, 71-83. 
44  See Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao’s speech at the Inaugural Session of the Conference on Public Diplomacy in the Information Age (New Delhi, Decem-
ber 10, 2010), accessed June 12, 2011 http://publicdiplomacy2010.in.
45  See Rizal Sukma, “So$ power and Public Diplomacy: #e Case of Indonesia,” in Public Diplomacy and So" Power in East Asia, edited by Sook Jong Lee, Jan 
Melissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
46  See Wang Yiwei, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of the Chinese So$ Power,” in Public Diplomacy in A Changing World, edited by Geo"rey Cowan and 
Nicholas J. Cull (!e Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 2006, Volume 616), 257-273; and Nicholas J. Cull, “Karen Hughes 
and the Brezhnev Syndrome,” 120. 
47  A Good example is the Communist Party Propaganda’s Department and media directives on the 2008 Beijing Olympics stating not to “criticize foreign 
a"airs without prior authorization” in Gary D. Rawnsley, “China Talks Back: Public Diplomacy and So$ Power for the Chinese Century,” in Routledge Hand-
book of Public Diplomacy, edited by Nancy Snow, Philip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 286-287; Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Into High Gear: China’s Public 
Diplomacy,” !e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 3 (2008): 40; Yang Jiechi, “Endeavor to Open a New Horizon of Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” 
accessed June 12, 2011, http://hr.china-embassy.org/eng/zxxx/t801925.htm. 
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 Borders between domestic and international policy-publics-actors in public diplomacy are narrowing, not 
disappearing, and the development of public diplomacy therefore requires an acknowledgement of societal realities.  !at’s 
why nowadays, where a public diplomacy “for” and “by” civil society is increasingly moving to the forefront, a purely 
government-centric approach is insu"cient. Expanding the number and scope of actors, publics, and the sophistication of 
relational initiatives into the public diplomacy strategy will provide no solace either. It will lack strategic e#ectiveness and 
could even be counterproductive if the overarching strategy does not sprout from the notion that public diplomacy is not 
binary. It must break with categorical mindsets and arti$cial $rewalls that are out of sync with prevailing societal dynamics.48 
 !ough post-Cold War modes of public diplomacy are now relics of the past, updating public diplomacy should 
not be understood as meaning a complete divestiture of “outdated” models. It requires the best of both and an awareness of 
where “old” and “new” intersect.  !e informational model of public diplomacy should be seen then as a logical precursor to 
a multi-actor network model lying upon the same continuum, and not as a completely separate and unconnected category. 
Rethinking public diplomacy must go beyond the distinction of “new” and “old,” “domestic” and “international.” !is uni$ed 
view is essential for moving the $eld forward and for pulling the “new” public diplomacy from its enclosure. !ere must be a 
stepping back from rigid categorizations and a wariness of absolutes. It is time to re-center the pendulum and search for the 
intersections between the categories of “international” and “domestic” and move towards more holistic approaches of public 
engagement. 
0*12.3(4*15&#*67-/(&7&8*.4()42&9::-*72$
 Successful public diplomacy starts at home. !is statement is intended neither as an attention grabber nor as an 
eyebrow-raising contradiction in terms. A relationship approach of public diplomacy, increasingly fashionable among scholars 
and practitioners, must transcend the inclusion of more exchange programs, more listening and more dialogue. Implementing 
the principles of reciprocity and mutuality implies the integration of a domestic component. One of the characteristics of 21st 
Century public diplomacy is the expansion of target audiences, as the support of the domestic audiences for foreign policy 
actions has become more crucial, especially with the emergence of “intermestic” a#airs when international and domestic 
a#airs merge and encroach on each other.49 Investing in the domestic spectrum is vital for putting the “new” public diplomacy 
and the currently en vogue citizen diplomacy further into practice and for pulling them out of their “people-to-people” 
rhetorical rut. 
 Two important considerations must be taken into account prior to investing in a public diplomacy with a domestic 
consciousness: it is neither another method of political brinkmanship nor another tool of domestic propaganda and public 
administration. Moving ahead with development of public diplomacy’s domestic dimension cannot be a means of achieving 
domestic political gain. Opinion polls and consultation with taxpayers must not just take place in the run-up to elections, and 
it must be protected from interference from political actors seeking votes.
 Evolutions in public diplomacy have a#ected its domestic facet. !is paper has argued that public diplomacy has 
evolved from an informational to a relational approach and that this has a#ected the domestic dimension as well.  !e two 
terms associated with public diplomacy, public a#airs and domestic outreach, must be understood within this framework.  
At the risk of oversimpli$cation, while the use of public a#airs $ts well within an informational or so-called “old” approach 
to public diplomacy, domestic outreach appeals to a network relational or so-called “new” approach to public diplomacy. 
While public a#airs speaks to a more state-centered approach, domestic outreach speaks to a multi-actor environment. While 
the $rst mainly perceives domestic citizens as publics to be informed (perceivers), the latter adds a more (inter)active role 
for domestic citizens in public diplomacy (participants, partners). While the use of public a#airs speaks to the separation of 
publics, domestic outreach enlightens the view of a domestic public that is integral to the implementation and success of the 
public diplomacy initiatives.50 While public a#airs stresses the di#erence with public diplomacy’s international dimension, 
domestic outreach, also interchangeably used with “domestic public diplomacy,” stresses the interplay between the domestic 
and international features of public diplomacy.
 Of greater importance is the question of how relevant is it to maintain a strict distinction between domestic and 
international or between public a#airs, domestic outreach and public diplomacy. To borrow from Bruce Gregory, these are 
“preferences of di#erent tribal cultures, not separate analytical categories.”51 !e reciprocal and interdependent relation
48  Zaharna, Battles to Bridges, 182.
49  György Szondi, “Central and Eastern European Public Diplomacy: A Transnational Perspective on National Reputation Management,” in Routledge Hand-
book of Public Diplomacy, edited by Nancy Snow, Philip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 304.
50  Zaharna, Battles to Bridges, 182.
51  Bruce Gregory, “Mapping Smart Power in Multi-Stakeholder Public Diplomacy/Strategic Communication,” presented at the New Approaches to US Global 
Outreach Conference, Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication, George Washington University, October 5, 2009. 
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between public diplomacy’s international and domestic features is becoming clearer in today’s social media landscape. It takes 
but a single click of a mouse for both foreigners and domestic citizens to gain access to identical governmental information 
and discover how easy it is for them to reach one another and join forces on foreign policy issues. Facebook exchanges in 
Egypt and Tunisia, for example, have been part of a two-year collaboration that has given birth to a pan-Arab democracy 
youth movement and that mixes the tactics of nonviolent resistance with Silicon Valley marketing tactics.52
 Neither identical nor opposed, the domestic and international features of public diplomacy are abundantly more 
similar than di!erent. Major public outreach characteristics (such as the means used) found in one are equally present in 
the other. One may cling to the distinction on the basis of di!erences in publics. "ese di!erences are present, of course, 
but though it can be argued that a unitary global public opinion is still more rhetoric than reality, citizens’ debates on 
internationally controversial issues are not hermetically sealed within a country and can migrate globally (e.g. cyber activity 
in North Africa and the Near East at the grass-roots level). Public diplomacy must not be alienated from the evolving context 
in which it operates: the amalgamation of domestic and international publics, actors, and policy spheres. Ministries are 
losing their grip on reality if they continue working within a culture of arti#cially established #rewalls just because “it has 
always been this way,” which leads to absurd everyday situations (di!erent websites for foreign and domestic publics where 
individuals have relatively easy access to both types of content).
 "e permeability between “foreign” and “domestic” and an increasingly active civil society is making a more holistic 
approach to public engagement a central element of a contemporary diplomacy. In this view, public diplomacy’s domestic and 
international dimensions are not two solitudes but two sides of the same coin, bolstering one another. Both Daryl Copeland 
and Evan Potter refer to public diplomacy’s Janus face: simultaneously looking inwards and outwards, whereby investments 
in the former correlate with the latter.53 Informing, sensitizing, in$uencing, and mobilizing are all steps in the public 
engagement process. A holistic approach must be at the core of public diplomacy’s grand strategy and draw attention to its 
complementarities instead of to its two-tongued Janus face. 
 "e integration of a domestic dimension into foreign policy machinery is nevertheless an arduous task forcing 
governments to think in terms of transformation instead of adaptation.54 Bombarding it with new digital toys (e.g. tweeting, 
blogging, embassies on Second Life, digital outreach teams) is like bandaging a wooden leg. "e current darling of social 
media cannot be used to legitimize traditional tasks.55 Transformation towards a 21st Century ministry needs to reconsider 
utilizing a bifurcated o%ce for public a!airs and public diplomacy and merge them into one “bureau” of public engagement. 
Further research, illustrated with best practices from the #eld, is needed on how to make this idea manifest in a workable 
model. As has been noted, newcomers to the scene seem to be less troubled by the international-domestic nexus than the early 
standard-setters, which are now stuck dragging their outdated luggage behind them.
 "e scholarly community’s mindset is being challenged as well. A more holistic approach to public engagement raises 
analytical questions about how to distinguish between (public) diplomacy and other forms of communication, relationship 
building in and between societies, and the legitimacy of maintaining these distinctions. Approaching public engagement more 
comprehensively could stimulate public diplomacy scholars to think beyond the old and new, but this requires the sacri#ce 
of some sacred cows. "is includes transcending the conviction that diplomacy is solely directed towards the outside and 
has nothing to do with the inside. Overcoming this single entrenched idea is perhaps the most challenging aspect of moving 
beyond categorical thinking in diplomacy. "e twin bastions of diplomacy and public diplomacy may be metamorphosing into 
an alternative inclusive mode of diplomacy, yet without a #rm domestic foundation it is doomed to collapse.
52  See David D. Kirkpatrick, David E. Sangera, “Tunisian-Egyptian Link "at Shook Arab History,” New York Times, February 13, 2011; Clay Shirky, “"e 
Political Power of Social Media,” Foreign A!airs (January/February 2011), 28-41. 
53  See Daryl Copeland, “James Eayrs on Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, and International Relations. A Twenty-#rst Century Retrospective,” International Journal, 
62 (Spring 2007): 52; Potter, Branding Canada, xiii.
54  Bruce Gregory makes this crucial point in his speech. Bruce Gregory, “On Mapping Smart Power in Multi-Stakeholder Public Diplomacy”.  
55  Monroe Price, Susan Haas, Drew Margolin, “New Technologies and International Broadcasting: Re$ection son adaptation and Transformation,” "e Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 161 (March 2008) quoted in Gregory, October 5, 2009. 
!"#$%&'()!'#$*%'"*
10
Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Vol. 2 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/exchange/vol2/iss1/6
!"
Alons, Gerry C. “Predicting a State’s Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3 (July 
 2007): 211-32.
Andrli! Mladen, Suzana Simichen-Sopta, Iva Tarle, “Practices of Public Diplomacy in Communicating NATO and EU Values with the Domestic Public in 
 Croatia.” Paper presented at ISA Conference, Montréal, March 16-19, 2011. 
Bardos, Arthur A. “Public diplomacy: An Old Art, a New Profession,” Virginia Quarterly Review 77 (2001): 424-37.
Bátora, Jozef. “Public Diplomacy between Home and Abroad: Norway and Canada,” !e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 1 (2006): 53–80.
Batora, Jozef. “Emerging Tenets of Responsive Foreign Policy Making,” International Journal 61 (Autumn 2006): 929-42. 
Boyle, Mark, Rob Kitchin. “Diaspora Strategy Wheel and Ten Principles of Good Practice.” Accessed June 12, 2011 http://www.nuim.ie/nirsa/diaspora. 
Brown, John. “Public Diplomacy and Propaganda: the Di"erences.” Accessed June 12, 2011. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/0709/comm/
 brown_pudiplprop.html.
Chitty, Naren. “Australian Public Diplomacy.” In Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, edited by Nancy Snow, Philip M. Taylor, 314-22. New York & 
 London: Routledge, 2008.
Chitty, Naren. “Public Diplomacy: Courting Publics for Short-term Advantage or Partnering Publics for Lasting Peace and Sustainable Prosperity?” Trials of 
 Engagement: !e Future of US Public Diplomacy, edited by Ali Fisher, Scott Lucas, 251-269. Leiden: Brill/Martinus Nijho" Publishers, 2011.
Copeland, Daryl. “James Eayrs on Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, and International Relations. A Twenty-#rst Century Retrospective.” International Journal 62 
 (Spring 2007). 
Cull, Nicholas J. “Karen Hughes and the Brezhnev Syndrome: $e Trial of Public Diplomacy as Domestic Performance.” In Trials of Engagement: !e Future of 
 US Public Diplomacy, edited by Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas, 117-32. (Leiden: Brill/Martinus Nijho" Publishers, 2011).
Cull, Nicholas J. “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,” in Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, edited by Geo"rey Cowan, Nicholas J. Cull, 31-54. 
 (!e ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. March 2006. 616).
Curtis, Steven and Caroline Clennell-Jaine. “Securing the State through Dialogue at Home: $e Bringing Foreign Policy Home Initiative: Pakistan Outreach.” 
 Paper presented at ISA Conference, Montréal, March 16-19, 2011. 
d’Hooghe, Ingrid. “Into High Gear: China’s Public Diplomacy,” !e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 3 (2008): 37-61.
Evans, Peter B. “Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Re%ections and Projections.” In Double-Edged Diplomacy: 
 International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, edited by Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam, 397-431. Berkeley/LA/California: 
 University of California Press, 2003. 
Fisher, Ali. “Looking at the Man in the Mirror: Understanding of Power and In%uence in Public Diplomacy.” In !e Future of US Public Diplomacy, edited by 
 Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas, 271-296. Leiden: Brill/Martinus Nijho" Publishers, 2011. 
Fitzpatrick, Katy R. “$e US Public Diplomacy’s Neglected Domestic Mandate,” USC Center on Public Diplomacy Perspectives, Paper 3 (October 2010).
Kathy R. Fitzpatrick. “U.S. Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: From Messaging to Mutuality.” Paper presented at ISA Conference, Montréal, March 16-
 19, 2011.
Gamlen, Alan. “Diaspora Engagement: What, How, Why?” Paper presented at the Exploring Diaspora Strategies Conference, NUI Maynooth, January 26-28, 
 2009.
Gilboa, Eytan. “Searching for a $eory of Public Diplomacy.” In Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, edited by Geo"rey Cowan, Nicholas J. Cull, 55-77. 
 (!e ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. March 2006. 616).
Government of Canada, Department of Foreign A"airs and International Trade, Domestic Outreach Division. Call for applications for the Foreign Policy 
 Dialogue. Citizen Diplomacy, Model Political Assemblies Program. November 9, 2005. 
Government of Canada. Department of Foreign A"airs and International Trade. Global Citizens Workshop, March 30, 2010. 
Government of Catalonia. Foreign A"airs Strategy 2011-2015. June 2010. 
Gregory, Bruce. “Mapping Smart Power in Multi-Stakeholder Public Diplomacy/Strategic Communication.” Presentation at the New Approaches to US Global 
 Outreach Conference, Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication. George Washington University. October 5, 2009. 
Heller, Ken S., Liza M. Persson. “$e Distinction between Public A"airs and Public Diplomacy.” In Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, edited by Nancy 
 Snow and Philip. M. Taylor, 225-233. New York: Routledge, 2009.
Hocking, Brian. “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy.” In !e New Public Diplomacy: So" Power in International Relations, edited by Jan  Melissen, 28-46. 
 New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005/7.. 
Huijgh, Ellen. “$e Public Diplomacy of Federated Entities: Examining the Quebec Model.” !e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 5 (2010): 125-50. 
Jiechi, Yang, “Endeavor to Open a New Horizon of Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics.”  Accessed June 12, 2011 http://hr.china-embassy.
 org/eng/zxxx/t801925.htm
Kirkpatrick, David D. and David E. Sangera. “Tunisian-Egyptian Link $at Shook Arab History.” New York Times, February 13, 2011.
Mc Riel, Cees and Charles Fombrun. Essentials of Corporate Communication (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).
#$%$&$'($)
!"#$%&'()!'#$*%'"*
11
Huijgh: Domestic Dimension
Published by SURFACE, 2013
!"
Melissen, Jan. “!e New Public Diplomacy: Between !eory and Practice.” In !e New Public Diplomacy: So" Power in International Relations, edited by Jan  
Melissen, 3–27. New York & London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005/7.
Melissen, Jan. “Public Diplomacy.” In Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: !eories and Practices, edited by Pauline Kerr, Geo" Wiseman. Oxford: Oxford 
 University  Press, forthcoming. 
Melissen, Jan. “!e New Public Diplomacy: Between !eory and Practice.” !e New Public Diplomacy: So" Power in International Relations, edited by Jan 
 Melissen, 3–27. New York & London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005/7.
Miliband, David. “Welcome to the FCO’s blog pages.” Last modi#ed June 12, 2011. https://blogs.fco.gov.uk/roller/miliband/entry/welcome_to_the_fcos_blog.
n.a. “Demographic Trends.” Facts About Germany. Accessed June 12, 2011. http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/society/main-content-08/demo
 graphic-trends.html.
n.a. “Immigration in Canada: A Portrait of the Foreign-born Population, 2006 Census: Immigration: Driver of population growth.” Statistics Canada. 
 Accessed June 12, 2011. http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-557/p2-eng.cfm.
Nossal, Kim R. “!e Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy: !e Elusive Ideal.” In Canada Among Nations: Democracy and Foreign Policy, edited by 
 Maxwell. A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, 29-44. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995.
O’Neill, Aine. “Advacing Diaspora Knowledge Networks.” Paper presented at the Exploring Diaspora Strategies Conference, NUI Maynooth, January 26-28, 
 2009.
Potter, Evan H. Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s So" Power through Public Diplomacy. Montreal QC/Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 
 2009. 
Monroe, Haas and Drew Margolin. “New Technologies and International Broadcasting: Re$ection son adaptation and Transformation.” !e ANNALS of the 
 American Academy of Political and Social Science 161 (March 2008), quoted in Gregory, October 5, 2009. 
Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: !e Logic of Two-level Games.” International Organization 42 (Summer 1998): 427-60. 
Rao, Nirupama. Speech at the Inaugural Session of the Conference on Public Diplomacy in the Information Age (New Delhi: December 10, 2010).  Last 
 modi#ed June 12, 2011 at http://publicdiplomacy2010.in. 
Rawnsley, Gary D. “China Talks Back: Public Diplomacy and So% Power for the Chinese Century.” In Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, edited by 
 Nancy Snow and Philip. M. Taylor, 282-291. New York: Routledge, 2009.
Riordan, Shaun. “Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm.” In !e New Public Diplomacy: So" Power in International Relations, 
 edited by Jan Melissen, 180-195. New York & London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005/7.
Shirky, Clay. “!e Political Power of Social Media.” Foreign A#airs (January/February 2011): 28-41. 
Snow, Nancy. “Rethinking Public Diplomacy.” In Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, edited by Nancy Snow, Philip M. Taylor, 3-12. New York & 
 London: Routledge, 2008.
Sukma, Rizal. “So% power and Public Diplomacy:  !e Case of Indonesia.” In Public Diplomacy and So" Power in East Asia, edited Sook Jong Lee and Jan 
 Melissen. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
Szondi, György. “Central and Eastern European Public Diplomacy: A Transnational Perspective on National Reputation Management,” Routledge Handbook 
 of Public Diplomacy, edited by Nancy Snow and Philip. M. Taylor, 292-313. New York: Routledge, 2009.
Szondi, György. “Public Diplomacy and Nation-Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Di"erences,” Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. !e Hague: Netherlands 
 Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” October 2008..
Szondi, György. “Central and Eastern European Public Diplomacy: A Transnational Perspective on National Reputation Management.” In Routledge 
 Handbook of Public Diplomacy, edited by  Nancy Snow and Philip. M. Taylor, 292-313. New York: Routledge, 2009.
Yiwei, Wang. “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of the Chinese So% Power.” In Public Diplomacy in A Changing World, edited by Geo"rey Cowan and Nicholas J. 
 Cull , 257-273. (!e ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. March 2006. 616).
Zaharna, Rhonda S. Battles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy a"er 9/11 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
Zaharna, Rhonda S. “!e Public Diplomacy Challenges of Strategic Stakeholder Engagement.” In Trials of Engagement: !e Future of US Public Diplomacy, 
 edited by Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas, 201-229. Leiden: Brill/Martinus Nijho" Publishers, 2011.
Zaharna, Rhonda S. “!e So% Power Di"erential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy,” !e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 
 2 (2007): 213–22.
!"#$%&'()!'#$*%'"*
Ellen Huijgh is pursuing doctoral research on public diplomacy in Canada’s capital and is currently a visiting scholar at Carleton 
University in Ottawa. As a Ph.D. candidate and co-editor of the Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, she is associated with the Dip-
lomatic Studies Programme of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” in !e Hague and the Political 
Science Department of the University of Antwerp in Belgium. She has also worked as a research fellow for the Flemish Centre for 
International Policy, as well as for the Communication Department of the Free University, Brussels.
12
Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Vol. 2 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/exchange/vol2/iss1/6
